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Introduction	  In	   1984,	   Rotary	   International	   established	   PolioPlus,	   its	   biggest	   volunteering	   and	  fundraising	  programme	  to	  date	  (Rotary	  International,	  2013).	  Inspired	  by	  these	  efforts,	  the	   World	   Health	   Assembly	   launched	   a	   public-­‐private	   partnership,	   the	   Global	   Polio	  Eradication	   Initiative	   (GPEI),	   in	   1988.	   It	   set	   the	   year	   2000	   as	   its	   target	   for	   the	  eradication	  of	  poliomyelitis	  (polio),	  deeming	  this,	   if	  met,	  an	  “appropriate	  gift,	   together	  with	  the	  eradication	  of	  smallpox,	  from	  the	  twentieth	  to	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century”	  (WHO,	  1988).	   The	   four	   ‘spearheading’	   GPEI	   partners	   are	   Rotary	   International,	   the	   World	  Health	  Organization	   (WHO),	   the	  United	  Nations	  Children’s	  Fund	   (UNICEF)	  and	   the	  US	  Centers	   for	   Disease	   Control	   and	   Prevention	   (CDC).	   The	   Bill	   and	   Melinda	   Gates	  Foundation	   is	   also	   a	   major	   contributor	   (GPEI,	   2010b).	   While	   the	   initial	   target	   was	  missed	  (polio	  remained	  in	  20	  countries	  across	  three	  regions	  in	  2000),	  the	  programme	  has	  made	   significant	   progress	   (Arita	   &	   Francis,	   2011).	   Polio	   is	   now	   endemic	   to	   only	  three	  states	  (Nigeria,	  Afghanistan	  and	  Pakistan),	  although	  there	  have	  been	  outbreaks	  in	  neighbouring	  countries	  (Arita	  &	  Francis,	  2011;	  The	  Persistence	  of	  Polio,	  2012).	  In	  May	  2012	   the	   World	   Health	   Assembly	   declared	   polio	   eradication	   “a	   programmatic	  emergency	  for	  global	  public	  health,”	  simultaneously	  making	  eradication	  a	  priority	  and	  highlighting	  its	  challenges	  (WHO,	  2012b).	  	   Infectious	  diseases	  are	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  eradicate.	  The	  campaign	  to	  rid	  the	  world	  of	  smallpox	  has	  been	  the	  only	  one	  to	  succeed	  (Barrett,	  2003).	  Global	  eradication	  can	  be	  achieved	  only	  if	  the	  “weakest	  link”	  country	  eliminates	  the	  disease	  in	  question	  (Barrett,	  2006).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  polio	  this	  was	  previously	  thought	  to	  be	  India,	  the	  country	  with	  the	  second	   largest	   population	   in	   the	   world;	   Bruce	   Aylward,	   former	   director	   of	   the	   GPEI,	  once	   remarked,	   “If	   the	  polio	  virus	  was	   to	  pick	   its	   last	   stand,	   its	  Alamo,	   so	   to	   speak,	   it	  would	  head	  for	  Uttar	  Pradesh”	  (Donnelly,	  2007).	  Yet	  there	  have	  been	  no	  incidences	  of	  the	  disease	  since	  January	  2011	  and,	  should	  this	  remain	  the	  case,	  India	  will	  formally	  be	  declared	   polio	   free	   in	   January	   2014	   (John,	   2012).	   This	   article	   examines	   eradication	  efforts	   in	   India	   in	   the	   context	   of	   global	   health	   diplomacy.	   Although	   it	   appears	   these	  efforts	   have	   ultimately	   been	   successful,	   they	   have	   not	   been	   without	   conflict	   or	  controversy.	   Several	   Indian	   public	   health	   professionals	   and	   other	   stakeholders	   have	  objected	   to	   various	   aspects	   of	   the	   GPEI’s	   operations	   within	   their	   country.	   Dissecting	  how	   such	   tensions	   arise	   and	   how	   they	   might	   be	   resolved	   can	   help	   us	   to	   better	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  global	  health	  initiatives.	  	  
Global	  health	  diplomacy	  Global	  health	  diplomacy	  (GHD)	  is	  an	  emerging	  field	  of	  enquiry,	  as	  the	  founding	  of	  this	  journal	  testifies.	  In	  recent	  years	  several	  scholars	  have	  attempted	  to	  demarcate	  this	  field,	  in	   terms	   of	   what	   GHD	   involves,	   who	   does	   it	   and	   how	   it	   should	   be	   studied.	   As	   both	  Feldbaum	  and	  Michaud	  (2010)	  and	  Lee	  and	  Smith	  (2011)	  demonstrate	  in	  their	  review	  articles,	  definitions	  range	   from	  the	  processes	  by	  which	   improvements	   in	  global	  health	  are	  sought	  (“multi-­‐level	  and	  multi-­‐actor	  negotiation	  processes	   that	  shape	  and	  manage	  the	  global	  policy	  environment	  for	  health”	  (Kickbusch,	  Silberschmidt	  &	  Buss,	  2007))	  to	  a	  means	  by	  which	   foreign	  policies	  are	  effected	  (“winning	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  people	   in	  poor	   countries	  by	   exporting	  medical	   care,	   expertise	   and	  personnel	   to	  help	   those	  who	  need	  it	  most”	  (Fauci,	  2007)).	  The	  analysis	  in	  this	  article	  sits	  at	  the	  Kickbusch	  et	  al.	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  considers	  the	  diplomacy	  of	  polio	  eradication,	  rather	  than	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diplomacy	   through	   polio	   eradication,	   by	   analysing	   different	   stakeholder	   perspectives	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  these	  have	  been	  heard.1	  	  Several	   GHD	   scholars	   highlight	   the	   important	   role	   that	   non-­‐state	   actors	   play	   in	   GHD	  (Adams,	   Novotny	   &	   Leslie,	   2008;	   Kickbusch,	   2011;	   Lee	   &	   Smith,	   2011).	   Non-­‐governmental	   organisations,	   activists,	   academics,	   health	  professionals	   and	   the	  private	  sector	   can	   all	   contribute,	   although	   those	   ‘at	   the	   coalface’	   of	   vaccination	   programmes	  may	  have	  little	  experience	  of	  international	  negotiations	  (Katz	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Lee	  &	  Smith,	  2011).	  Although	  the	  GPEI	   is	   led	  by	  national	  governments	  (GPEI,	  2010b),	   the	  impact	  of	  non-­‐state	   actors	   has	   been	   considerable,	   not	   least	   financially.	   By	   way	   of	   example,	   as	  Prime	   Minister	   David	   Cameron	   announced	   in	   2011	   that	   the	   UK	   would	   increase	   its	  funding	  from	  £20	  million	  to	  £40	  million	  ($60	  million),	  Bill	  Gates	  added	  $100	  million	  to	  his	   foundation’s	  already	  sizeable	  contribution	  (Zaracostas,	  2011).	  Rotary	  International	  has	   raised	   more	   than	   $1	   billion	   to	   date	   (Rotary	   International,	   2013)	   and	   the	   Gates	  Foundation	  has	  since	  pledged	  a	   further	  $1.8	  billion,	  a	   third	  of	   the	   total	  budget	   for	   the	  2013-­‐18	   strategic	   plan.	   To	   encourage	   other	   donors,	   the	  2016-­‐18	   tranche	  will	   only	   be	  released	  when	   the	   GPEI	   has	   secured	   the	   remaining	   two	   thirds	   of	   the	   funding	   (Bill	   &	  Melinda	  Gates	   Foundation,	   2013).	   This	   level	   of	   influence	   from	  non-­‐state	   actors	   raises	  several	   research	  questions	   for	  GHD	  scholars.	  Adams,	  Novotny	  and	  Leslie	   (2008)	  have	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  these	  donors	  and	  recipient	  governments.	   More	   broadly,	   Lee	   and	   Smith	   (2011)	   ask:	   (a)	   how	   do	   different	   actors	  participate	   in	   GHD?	   (b)	   what	   determines	   their	   power	   and	   influence?	   and	   (c)	   which	  actors	   are	   under-­‐represented?	   This	   article	   seeks	   to	   answer	   these	   questions	   in	   the	  context	  of	  polio	  eradication	  in	  India.	  It	  finds	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  disjuncture	  between	  the	   national	   and	   global	   levels,	   which	   has	   hampered	   the	   GPEI’s	   operations.	   The	   two	  versions	  of	  the	  polio	  story	  which	  follow	  the	  methodology	  section	  below	  give	  a	  flavour	  of	  this	   disjuncture.	   The	   article	   then	   presents	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   polio	   as	   a	   disease	   and	  provides	  a	  systematic	  review	  of	   the	  different	   tensions	  and	  controversies	   in	   the	   Indian	  case.	  It	  ends	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  data	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  GHD	  literature,	  arguing	  that	  better	   communications	   between	   stakeholders	   might	   have	   quickened	   elimination	   of	  polio	  from	  India.	  	  
Methodology	  This	  article	  was	  inspired	  by	  preliminary	  fieldwork	  for	  a	  bioethics	  project,	  conducted	  in	  Delhi,	  Mumbai,	  Pune	  and	  Kolkata	  in	  2008.	  Forty-­‐two	  informal	  meetings	  were	  held:	  12	  at	  universities	  or	  research	  institutions;	  7	  at	  research	  active	  NGOs;	  21	  with	  other	  NGOs;	  one	  with	   someone	   from	   the	   private	   sector;	   and	   one	   with	   a	   journalist.	   Through	   these	  conversations	   the	   story	   of	   polio	   eradication	   in	   India	   gradually	   emerged,	   but	   as	   they	  were	  not	  formal	  interviews	  none	  are	  quoted	  here.	  To	  garner	  a	  range	  of	  views	  on	  polio,	  systematic	   searches	   of	   academic	   databases	   and	   relevant	  websites	  were	   subsequently	  performed.	  In	  December	  2008	  the	  Web	  of	  Knowledge	  database	  generated	  40	  sources	  on	  the	   topic	  “Global	  Polio	  Eradication	   Initiative”	  dating	  back	  to	  1992	  and	  139	  sources	  on	  the	   topic	   “polio”	  back	   to	   January	  2006.	  From	  September	  2009	   to	   June	  2013	   the	  Zetoc	  Alert	  Service	  provided	  219	  relevant	  matches	  for	  “polio”.	  In	  addition,	  the	  websites	  of	  the	  WHO,	   the	   GPEI,	   India’s	   National	   Polio	   Surveillance	   Project	   (NPSP)	   and	   the	   journals	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Examining	  the	  GPEI	  as	  a	  foreign	  policy	  tool	  and/or	  liability	  would	  be	  equally	  valid	  avenues	  of	  enquiry.	  There	   are	   human	   security	   implications	   should	   eradication	   fail	   and	   it	   was	   misperceptions	   of	   Western	  states’	   foreign	  policies	  that	  halted	  polio	  vaccinations	  in	  Kano	  state	  in	  Nigeria	  in	  2003.	  Vaccinations	  only	  restarted	  after	  intense	  diplomatic	  efforts	  (Katz	  et	  al.,	  2011).	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Indian	   Pediatrics,	   Indian	   Journal	   of	   Medical	   Research,	   The	   National	   Medical	   Journal	   of	  
India	   and	   Economic	   and	   Political	   Weekly	   (an	   Indian	   social	   sciences	   journal	   and	  commentary	   on	   current	   affairs	   to	  which	   academics	   and	   activists	   contribute)	  were	   all	  searched	  for	  relevant	  information.	  Although	  there	  has	  been	  scepticism	  about	  the	  polio	  eradication	   campaign	   in	   India	   since	   its	   inception	   (Huang,	   2013),	   the	   article	   draws	  mainly	   on	   sources	   published	   within	   the	   last	   decade.	   Beyond	   the	   search	   terms	  articulated	  above,	   a	  grounded	   theory	  approach	   to	   the	  data	  was	  employed;	   that	   is,	   the	  analytical	   themes	   discussed	   below—the	   programme	   as	   an	   entity,	   programme	  governance,	   type	   of	   vaccine	   used,	   impact	   on	   other	   health	   services	   and	   community	  engagement—were	  suggested	  by	   the	  data	  rather	   than	  preordained.	  To	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  feeling	  in	  India	  and	  to	  allow	  the	  data	  to	  ‘speak’	  for	  itself,	  several	  sources	  are	   quoted	   verbatim.	   Key	   stakeholders	   and	   commentators	   are:	   public	   health	  professionals	   and	   medical	   academics	   in	   India,	   including	   members	   of	   the	   Indian	  Academy	   of	   Pediatrics;	   social	   scientists;	   and	  members	   of	   communities	   served	   by	   the	  polio	  eradication	  programme.	  	  
Story	  1.	  When	  the	  GPEI	  was	  launched	  in	  1988,	  there	  were	  an	  estimated	  350,000	  cases	  of	  polio	  occurring	   across	  125	   countries	   annually	   (WHO,	  2012a).	  By	  1999,	   the	   annual	  caseload	  had	  reduced	  by	  99%	  and	  by	  late	  2003	  polio	  was	  endemic	  to	  only	  six	  countries,	  including	   India	   (WHO,	  2003;	  WHO	  2012a).	   In	  2004,	   as	   the	  WHO	  was	  on	   the	  brink	  of	  ridding	  the	  world	  of	  polio,	  the	  state	  of	  Kano	  in	  Nigeria	  had	  suspended	  vaccinations,	  in	  “a	  triumph	  of	  superstition	  over	  science”	  (Another	  Health	  Disaster	  in	  Africa,	  2004).2	  The	  programme	  recovered	  after	  successful	  diplomatic	  intervention	  (Kaufman	  &	  Feldbaum,	  2009)	  and	  innovations	  in	  vaccine	  research	  renewed	  hope	  in	  the	  eradication	  endeavour,	  with	  successful	  trial	  results	  being	  published	  in	  The	  Lancet	  and	  the	  New	  England	  Journal	  
of	  Medicine	   (Grassly	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Jenkins	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Sutter	   et	   al.,	   2010).	  At	   the	   June	  2010	  Rotary	   International	  Convention,	  Bruce	  Aylward,	   then	  director	  of	   the	  GPEI,	   told	  supporters,	  “in	  the	  past	  twelve	  months	  you	  have	  proved,	  without	  a	  doubt,	  that	  polio	  can	  be	   eradicated”	   (Grahl,	   2010).	   The	   incremental	   net	   benefits	   of	   the	  GPEI	   from	  1988	   to	  2035	  have	  been	  estimated	  at	  $40-­‐50	  billion,	  with	  85	  per	  cent	  of	  these	  attributed	  to	  low	  income	  countries	  (Tebbens	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
Story	   2.	   In	   1988,	  when	   the	   GPEI	  was	   launched,	   32,419	   cases	   of	   polio	  were	   reported	  worldwide.	   The	   WHO	   increased	   this	   figure	   tenfold,	   arguing	   that	   the	   reported	   cases	  could	   only	   be	   a	   small	   sample	   of	   the	   true	   number	   (Sathyamala	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   In	   the	  
Geneva	  Declaration	   for	   the	   Eradication	   of	   Poliomyelitis	   of	   January	   2004,	   this	   estimate	  became	  350,000	  reported	  cases,	  “by	  a	  magical	  stroke	  of	  the	  keyboard”	  (Sathyamala	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  A	  few	  months	  later,	  a	  group	  of	  sixteen	  public	  health	  professionals	  from	  India	  sent	   a	  memorandum	   to	   the	  WHO	   India	   office,	   UNICEF	   and	   the	   Government	   of	   India,	  voicing	   their	  concern	  at	   the	  way	   in	  which	   “the	  entire	  polio	  eradication	   ‘initiative’	  has	  been	   thrust	   on	   our	   country”	   (All	   India	   Drug	   Action	   Network,	   2008).	   Two	   of	   the	  signatories,	   with	   a	   third	   colleague,	   wrote	   to	   The	   Lancet	   in	   2007,	   expressing	   their	  dismay	   that	   it	   should	   have	   seen	   fit	   to	   publish	   the	   results	   of	   a	   polio	   vaccine	   study	  conducted	   in	   India	   which	   they	   considered	   unethical	   (Puliyel,	   Sathyamala	   &	   Banerji,	  2007).	   Other	   experts	   cast	   doubt	   on	  whether	   eradication	  was	   achievable	   and	   instead	  advocated	   a	   control	   programme	   (Arita,	   Nakane	   &	   Fenner,	   2006;	   Yadav	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   The	   state	   government	   suspended	   vaccinations,	   under	   pressure	   from	   militant	   Muslim	   clerics,	   who	  claimed	   that	   the	   vaccination	  programme	  was	   a	  western	  plot	   to	   render	   girls	   infertile	   (see	  BBC,	   2003	  &	  2004).	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Emerson	  &	  Singer,	  2010;	  Jack,	  2011).	  Estimated	  at	  $8	  billion	  (Calloway,	  2013),	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  initiative	  have	  spiralled	  rapidly,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  other	  health	  priorities.	  
	  
Polio—an	  overview	  Polio	   is	   a	   virus	   spread	   through	   person-­‐to-­‐person	   contact,	   usually	   via	   the	   faecal-­‐oral	  route	  (that	  is,	  through	  contaminated	  food	  and	  water).	  It	  is	  known	  for	  its	  crippling	  effects	  on	  people’s	   limbs,	  but	   this	  occurs	   in	  only	  one	   in	  every	  200	   infections,	  when	   the	  virus	  reaches	  the	  central	  nervous	  system.	  Most	  people	  have	  no	  symptoms	  and	  do	  not	  know	  they	   are	   infected,	  which	  makes	  monitoring	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   disease	   very	   difficult.	   A	  single	   case	   of	   polio	   paralysis	   is	   thus	   evidence	   of	   a	   possible	   epidemic	   (GPEI,	   2010c).	  There	  are	  three	  strains	  of	  poliovirus—type	  1,	  type	  2	  and	  type	  3—and	  two	  main	  types	  of	  vaccine,	  oral	  and	  injected.	  No	  cases	  of	  wild	  type	  2	  virus	  have	  been	  detected	  since	  1999,	  but	   wild	   (as	   opposed	   to	   vaccine-­‐derived)	   types	   1	   and	   3	   are	   found	   in	   the	   remaining	  endemic	   countries	   (GPEI,	   2010d).	   The	  possibility	   of	   transmission	   of	   poliovirus	   across	  borders	  is	  a	  constant	  threat	  (GPEI,	  2013).	  	  The	  GPEI	  is	  based	  largely	  on	  a	  strategy	  of	  immunisation	  in	  endemic	  countries	  through	  oral	   poliovirus	   vaccines	   (OPVs).	   The	   WHO	   recommends	   and	   funds	   OPVs	   over	   the	  alternative	   injectable	   kind	   (inactivated	   polio	   vaccines	   or	   IPVs)	   for	   areas	   where	   the	  disease	   is	   endemic,	   as	   they	   have	   the	   advantage	   that	   non-­‐vaccinated	   children	   may	  develop	  immunity	  through	  the	  faecal-­‐oral	  route	  (Dawson	  &	  Paul,	  2006).	  They	  are	  also	  considerably	   cheaper	   (Calloway,	  2013).	  A	   trivalent	   version	  of	  OPV	  was	   the	  vaccine	  of	  choice	  for	  many	  years,	  as	  it	  combated	  all	  three	  strains	  of	  the	  virus.	  While	  it	  was	  effective	  in	  eliminating	  type	  2	  virus,	   it	  was	  less	  successful	  against	  types	  1	  and	  3.	  More	  recently,	  monovalent	   vaccines	   targeting	   either	   type	   1	   or	   3	   have	   been	   trialled	   and	   used	   and	   in	  2009	  a	  bivalent	  vaccine	   to	   tackle	  both	   types	  was	  developed	   (Aylward	  &	  Tangermann,	  2011).	  But	  there	  is	  a	  complication,	  in	  that	  the	  live	  viruses	  in	  OPVs	  can	  mutate	  and	  cause	  paralysis	   in	   both	   vaccine	   recipients	   and	   third	   parties	   (again,	   through	   faecal-­‐oral	  transmission).	   This	   is	   called	   vaccine	   associated	   paralytic	   poliomyelitis	   (VAPP)	   and	   is	  particularly	   likely	   to	   occur	   in	   individuals	   with	   compromised	   immune	   systems.	   Many	  developed	  countries	  have	  switched	  to	  IPV	  to	  avoid	  the	  threat	  of	  VAPP	  (Paul	  &	  Dawson,	  2005;	  Dawson	  &	  Paul,	  2006).	  	  The	   National	   Polio	   Surveillance	   Project	   (NPSP),	   a	   joint	   initiative	   between	   the	  Government	  of	  India	  and	  the	  WHO,	  is	  responsible	  for	  implementing	  the	  GPEI	  in	  India.	  It	  is	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health’s	  most	  expensive	  public	  health	  programme	  to	  date.	  In	  2007,	  for	  instance,	   India	   spent	   more	   on	   polio	   eradication	   than	   on	   all	   other	   disease	   control	  programmes	  and	  by	  August	  2012	  had	  contributed	  a	  total	  of	  more	  than	  $2	  billion	  to	  the	  eradication	  effort	  (John,	  2007;	  Roberts,	  2012).	  By	  2001,	  polio	  remained	  primarily	  in	  two	  states,	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  and	  Bihar,	  where	  dense	  populations	  and	   low	  standards	  of	   living	  rendered	   it	   stubbornly	   resistant	   (Donnelly,	   2007;	   Chowdhary	   &	   Dhole,	   2008;	   Paul,	  2008;	  Chatterjee,	  Vidyant	  &	  Dhole,	  2013).	  As	   in	  other	  countries,	  routine	  immunisation	  in	   India	   (with	   OPV)	   is	   supplemented	   with	   National	   Immunization	   Days	   (NIDs;	   also	  known	   as	   Pulse	   Polio	   Immunisation,	   or	   PPI),	   which	   include	   house-­‐to-­‐house	   ‘mop-­‐up’	  rounds	  (Nair,	  2002).	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  PPI	  initiative,	  which	  began	  in	  1995,	  was	  to	  eradicate	  polio	   by	  2000	   and	   certify	   India	   as	  polio-­‐free	   five	   years	   later	   (Jeffery	  &	   Jeffery,	   2010).	  Although	  this	  target	  was	  missed	  by	  almost	  a	  decade	  (in	  fact	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  surged	  from	  66	  in	  2005	  to	  676	  in	  2006	  (NPSP,	  2011)),	  generally	  PPI	  is	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  factors	  behind	  the	  eventual	  elimination	  of	  the	  disease,	  together	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	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the	   bivalent	   vaccine	   in	   2010	   (John	   &	   Vashishtha,	   2012;	   Chatterjee,	   Vidyant	   &	   Dhole,	  2013;	  Vashishtha	  &	  Kumar,	  2013).3	  
	  
Review	  of	  perspectives	  on	  polio	  in	  India	  As	  outlined	  above,	  perspectives	  on	  polio	  eradication	  in	  India	  can	  be	  categorised	  into	  five	  themes:	   the	   programme	   as	   an	   entity,	   programme	   governance,	   type	   of	   vaccine	   used,	  impact	  on	  other	  health	  services	  and	  community	  engagement.	  	  
The	  programme	  as	  an	  entity	  Views	  on	  polio	  in	  India	  range	  from	  opposition	  to	  the	  eradication	  programme	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  specific	  technical	  and	  ethical	  concerns.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  the	  former,	  in	  a	  2007	  Indian	  
Journal	  of	  Medical	  Research	  editorial,	  paediatricians	  Puliyel,	  Gupta	  and	  Mathew	  objected	  to	   the	   Indian	   government	   having	   to	   borrow	   $180	  million	   to	   finance	   the	   programme,	  once	  “donor	  fatigue”	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  an	  initial	  grant	  of	  $20	  million	  had	  set	  in.	  Echoing	  the	  group	  of	  public	  health	  professionals	  who	  had	  sent	  the	  memorandum	  to	  WHO	  India	  and	  partners	   in	   2004,	   they	   claimed	   that	   polio	   eradication	   had	   not	   been	   a	   public	   health	  priority	   in	   developing	   countries	   when	   the	   GPEI	   began	   in	   1998	   (Puliyel,	   Gupta	   &	  Mathew,	   2012).	   Other	   health	   professionals	   have	   seen	   such	   stances	   as	   unhelpful	   and	  urged	  broad	  support	  for	  the	  programme.	  John,	  a	  past	  president	  of	  the	  Indian	  Academy	  of	  Pediatrics	  (IAP)	  and	  chair	  of	  the	  NPSP’s	  India	  Expert	  Advisory	  Group	  (set	  up	  in	  1999	  to	  monitor	  progress	  and	  provide	  technical	  advice	  (NPSP,	  2005)),	  responded	  to	  the	  2004	  memorandum	  in	  another	  Indian	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Research	  editorial.	  He	  acknowledged	  that	  aspects	  of	  the	  eradication	  programme	  were	  “debatable”,	  but	  encouraged	  people	  to	  choose	   duty	   over	   dissent	   and	   refrain	   from	   fuelling	   controversies,	   so	   as	   not	   to	  compromise	  the	  eradication	  effort	  (John,	  2004a).	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  adverse	  media	  reports,	  he	  and	  fellow	  members	  of	  the	  IAP	  Polio	  Eradication	  Committee	  made	  a	  second	  plea	  in	  a	  2006	  Indian	  Pediatrics	  editorial,	  asking	  IAP	  members	  and	  other	  health	  professionals	  to	  “uphold	   the	  morale	  of	   the	  workers	   and	   the	   trust	  of	   the	   families”	   and	   to	   “refrain	   from	  creating	   or	   spreading	   messages	   of	   despair	   and	   disharmony”	   (John,	   Shah	   &	   Thacker,	  2006).	   More	   recently,	   John	   and	   Vashishtha	   (Convener	   of	   the	   IAP	   Committee	   on	  Immunization)	  have	  described	  the	  apparent	  elimination	  of	  wild	  polio	   from	  India	  as	  “a	  shot	  in	  the	  arm	  of	  GPEI”	  (John	  &	  Vashishtha,	  2012),	  while	  Puliyel	  and	  fellow	  paediatrian	  Vashisht	  have	  declared	  the	  amount	  developing	  countries	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  spend	  on	  polio	  eradication	  relative	  to	  other	  diseases	  as	  unethical.	  They	  see	  the	  GPEI	  as	  a	  warning	  against	  vertical,	  disease	  specific	  programmes	  in	  the	  future	  (Puliyel	  &	  Vashisht,	  2012).	  	  
Programme	  governance	  John	  has	  himself	  been	  critical	  of	  the	  eradication	  programme	  in	  India,	  particularly	  with	  regard	   to	   its	   governance.	  He	   has	   expressed	  dissatisfaction	  with	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	   set	  up	   the	   Indian	  programme	  without	   recourse	   to	  expertise	  within	  the	   country,	   stating,	   “The	   MoH	   did	   not	   ask	   the	   Indian	   Council	   of	   Medical	   Research	  (ICMR)	   or	   National	   Institute	   of	   Communicable	   Diseases	   (NICD),	   both	  wings	   under	   its	  control,	   to	   verify	   conclusions	   of	   earlier	   Indian	   studies	   or	   provide	   scientific	   basis	   for	  strategy-­‐design	  and	  mid-­‐course	  corrections.	  Science	  was	  neglected	  due	  to	  blind	  faith	  in	  the	  prescriptions	  of	  GPEI,	  which	  had	  always	  disregarded	  Indian	  research”	  (John,	  2007).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  2002,	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  each	  year	  from	  2000	  to	  2005	  was	  significantly	  lower	  than	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   (NPSP,	   2011).	   Some	   critics	   attributed	   these	   falling	   numbers	   to	   changes	   in	   the	  modes	   of	   case	   definition	   and	   calculation	   rather	   than	   real	   progress	   in	   preventing	   transmission	  (Sathyamala	  et	  al.,	  2005).	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Agarwal	   (2008),	   another	   past	   President	   of	   the	   IAP,	   has	   similarly	   complained	   that	   the	  GPEI	   in	   India	  has	  been	  prejudiced	  against	   indigenous	  expert	  advice.	  The	  Grassly	  et	  al.	  study	  cited	  in	  Story	  2	  had	  shown	  that,	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  efficacy	  of	  orally	  administered	  vaccines	   is	   compromised	   by	   diarrhoea	   and	   other	   infections,	   a	  monovalent	   vaccine	   is	  almost	  three	  times	  as	  effective	  against	  type	  1	  polio	  as	  the	  trivalent	  vaccine.	  This	  led	  the	  GPEI	  to	  devise	  a	  strategy	  to	  tackle	  the	  different	  polio	  viruses	  separately	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  and	   Bihar,	   the	   remaining	   polio	   strongholds,	   with	   type	   1	   to	   be	   tackled	   first.	   Agarwal	  (2008)	   commented,	   “Though,	   technically	   the	   decision	  may	   have	   some	  merits,	   but	   on	  moral	  and	  ethical	  grounds,	  the	  decision	  raises	  certain	  serious	  concerns”	  (namely	  that	  if	  the	  trivalent	  vaccine	  was	  not	  used,	  people	  would	  be	  exposed	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  contracting	  type	   3	   polio,	   which	   is	   just	   as	   debilitating	   as	   type	   1).	   The	   IAP	   thus	   recommended	   a	  “judicious	   mix”	   of	   both,	   rather	   than	   one	   followed	   by	   the	   other	   (Agarwal,	   2008).	   Its	  predictions	   were	   borne	   out.	   The	   2010-­‐12	   GPEI	   strategic	   plan	   noted,	   “Optimizing	   the	  impact	  of	  the	  new	  monovalent	  OPVs	  has	  proven	  more	  complicated	  than	  anticipated	  and	  in	  some	  settings	  contributed	  to	  alternating	  outbreaks	  of	  the	  remaining	  wild	  poliovirus	  type	   1	   (WPV1)	   and	   wild	   poliovirus	   type	   3	   (WPV3)	   serotypes”	   (WHO,	   2010).	   (The	  introduction	  of	  the	  bivalent	  vaccine	  in	  2010	  eventually	  neutralised	  this	  problem).	  	  	   Choice	  of	  vaccine	  Another	   debate	   has	   centred	   on	   whether	   OPV	   should	   be	   used	   at	   all,	   or	   whether	   IPV	  would	   be	   a	   preferable	   alternative.	   Several	   commentators	   in	   India	   have	   been	   deeply	  critical	  of	   the	  reliance	  on	  oral	  vaccines,	  believing	   this	   to	  be	  based	  on	  economic	  rather	  than	   medical	   or	   moral	   grounds.	   Puliyel,	   with	   Madhavi,	   a	   scientist	   at	   the	   National	  Institute	   of	   Science,	  Technology	   and	  Development	   Studies,	   has	  described	   the	  NPSP	  as	  the	   “organ”	   of	   the	  WHO	   in	   this	   respect	   (Puliyel	   &	  Madhavi,	   2008).	   Using	   polio	   as	   an	  example	   of	   what	   they	   identify	   as	   a	   wider	   problem	   of	   vaccines	   being	   foisted	   on	  developing	   countries,	   they	   warn,	   “Developing	   countries	   cannot	   expect	   international	  agencies	   like	  WHO	   to	  be	   an	  honest	   broker	  between	   themselves	   and	  private	   for-­‐profit	  vaccine	  manufacturers.	  The	  public	  need	   to	  maintain	   a	  healthy	   skepticism	  of	   the	   ‘facts	  and	   figures’	   provided	   by	   vested	   interests	   and	   of	   the	   international	   agencies	   that	   are	  influenced	  by	  such	  vested	  interests”	  (Puliyel	  &	  Madhavi,	  2008).	  	  Perhaps	  surprisingly,	  John	  has	  been	  no	  less	  disparaging.	  He	  has	  repeatedly	  called	  for	  a	  switch	   to	   IPV,	  most	   recently	   in	   a	  2012	  paper	   entitled	   “Inactivated	  Poliovirus	  Vaccine:	  The	  Fog	  of	  Uncertainty	   is	  Lifting!”	   In	  2006	  he	   labelled	  OPV	   the	   “mascot”	  of	   the	  WHO,	  alleging	  that	  the	  organisation	  continued	  to	  push	  its	  use	  because	  it	  maintains	  ownership	  of	   the	   original	   Sabin	   strains.	   He	   derided	   the	   view	   that	   OPV	   is	   superior	   in	   some	  circumstances	  because	  of	  faecal-­‐oral	  transmission	  of	  immunity	  as	  “a	  ruse	  to	  justify	  OPV”	  and	   a	   “dogma”	   that	   was	   “scientifically	   discredited”	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s.	   Those	  countries	   that	   make	   decisions	   independently	   of	   the	   WHO,	   he	   noted,	   use	   IPV	   (John,	  2006a;	   John,	   2006b).	   According	   to	   John,	   in	   the	   1980s	   public	   and	   private	   sector	  companies	   in	   India	   began	   to	   manufacture	   IPV,	   but	   were	   shut	   down	   when	   the	  government	  did	  not	  grant	  the	  necessary	  licences,	  against	  the	  advice	  of	  Indian	  scientists	  (John,	  2005;	  John,	  2006a;	  John,	  2006b;	  John	  &	  Vashishtha,	  2009).	  Polio	  experts	  both	  in	  and	   outside	   of	   India	   would	   now	   like	   to	   see	   IPV	   production	   set	   up	   in	   developing	  countries	   to	   bring	   costs	   down	   and	   thus	   render	   a	   worldwide	   switch	   to	   IPV	   viable	  (Emerson	   &	   Singer,	   2010	   Heinsbroek	   &	   Ruitenberg,	   2010;	   Arita	   &	   Francis,	   2011;	  Aylward	  &	  Tangermann,	  2011;	   John	  &	  Vashishtha,	  2012;	  Chatterjee,	  Vidyant	  &	  Dhole,	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2013).	   The	   GPEI	   is	   itself	   moving	   towards	   this	   position	   (Aylward	   &	   Tadataka,	   2011;	  WHO,	  2013).	  	  The	  relatively	  small	  group	  of	  people	  whose	  health	  is	  directly	  and	  adversely	  affected	  by	  the	   administration	   of	   OPV	   must	   also	   be	   considered;	   that	   is,	   those	   who	   contract	  VAPP.	  The	  WHO’s	  1998	  definition	  of	  polio	  eradication	  referred	  to	  wild	  poliovirus	  only,	  a	  situation	  which	   John	   (2004b)	   described	   as	   leaving	   “much	   to	   be	   desired.”	   (In	   a	  major	  change	   from	   previous	   plans,	   the	   draft	   Polio	   Eradication	   and	   Endgame	   Strategic	   Plan	  2013-­‐18	  aims	   to	  eradicate	  vaccine-­‐derived	  polio	  as	  well	   as	  wild	   forms	   (WHO,	  2013)).	  VAPP	  occurs	  on	  average	  only	  once	  in	  every	  2.7	  million	  first	  doses	  of	  OPV	  (GPEI,	  2010a),	  but	   given	   the	   frequency	   and	   pervasiveness	   of	   vaccination4	   and	   the	   size	   of	   the	  population,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  children	  in	  India	  have	  been	  affected	  (Paul	  &	  Dawson,	  2005).	  Paul	  and	  Dawson	  (2005),	  a	  paediatrician	  and	  ethicist	  respectively,	  would	  like	  “at	  the	  very	  least”	  to	  see	  compensation	  made	  available	  for	  those	  who	  contract	  VAPP.	  John	  (2006a)	   has	   similarly	   stated	   that	   children	   paralysed	   through	   VAPP	   in	   India	   are	   not	  compensated,	  or	  even	  recognised	  and	  that,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  the	  ethical	  response	  would	  be	  free	  treatment	  and	  rehabilitation.	  	  
Effects	  on	  other	  health	  services	  The	  polio	  eradication	  programme	  may	  have	  also	  indirectly	  affected	  the	  health	  of	  a	  great	  number	  of	  people	  in	  India,	  through	  its	  impact	  on	  health	  services	  provision.	  International	  and	  national	   level	  assessments	  of	  this	   impact	  are	  quite	  different.	   In	   its	  polio	   factsheet,	  the	  WHO	  (2012a)	  states,	  “In	  most	  countries,	  the	  global	  effort	  has	  expanded	  capacities	  to	  tackle	   other	   infectious	   diseases	   by	   building	   effective	   surveillance	   and	   immunization	  systems.”	  The	  draft	  2013-­‐18	  GPEI	  strategic	  plan	  makes	  a	  similar	  claim	  (WHO,	  2013)	  and	  Rath	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  writing	  in	  the	  Expert	  Review	  of	  Vaccines,	  maintain	  that	  the	  GPEI	  has	  helped	  to	  improve	  the	  general	  delivery	  of	  preventive	  healthcare.	  By	  contrast,	  Yadav	  and	  colleagues	   from	   the	   All	   India	   Institute	   of	   Medical	   Sciences	   have	   calculated	   that	   the	  “massive	  mobilization”	  of	  resources	  for	  PPI	  in	  India	  has	  had	  a	  negative	  bearing	  on	  other	  services	  (outpatient	  care,	  emergency	  and	  maternal	  services	  and	  routine	  immunisation),	  which	  are	  all	  suspended	  for	  the	  3-­‐4	  days	  of	  each	  pulse	  polio	  round	  (Yadav	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Others	   in	   India	   have	   likewise	   contended	   that	   other	   health	   programmes	   have	   been	  adversely	   affected	   by	   the	   focus	   on	   polio	   (John,	   2006b;	   Vashisht	   &	   Puliyel,	   2012;	  Vashishtha	   &	   Kumar,	   2013).	   With	   finite	   overall	   funding	   available,	   programmes	   to	  combat	   diseases	   such	   as	   tuberculosis,	   malaria	   and	   diarrhoea	   may	   have	   suffered	  (although	   John	   (2013)	   now	   hopes	   that	   resources	   from	   the	   polio	   campaign	   will	   be	  targeted	   at	   routine	   immunisation	   against	   measles	   and	   other	   diseases).	   Jeffery	   and	  Jeffery	  (2010),	  sociologists	  with	  longstanding	  research	  interests	  in	  India,	  report	  that	  in	  2005-­‐6	   in	   Uttar	   Pradesh,	   fewer	   than	   one	   in	   four	   children	   received	   the	   full	   routine	  immunisation	   package	   against	   tuberculosis,	   measles,	   diphtheria	   and	   polio,	   but	   that	  almost	   nine	   in	   every	   ten	   had	   been	   covered	   by	   the	   polio	   programme.	   Writing	   in	   the	  context	   of	   global	   health	   diplomacy	   more	   generally,	   Adams	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   concur	   with	  these	   findings,	   arguing	   that	   disease-­‐specific	   programmes	   such	   as	   the	   GPEI	  may	   have	  weakened	  public	   health	   infrastructure,	   by	  not	  paying	   sufficient	   attention	   to	  how	   they	  integrate	  with	  national	  bodies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Through	  the	  combination	  of	  routine	  vaccinations	  and	  the	  NIDs,	  children	  can	  receive	  ten	  or	  more	  doses	  in	   the	   first	   five	   years	   of	   life,	   rather	   than	   the	   originally	   recommended	   three	   (Paul	   &	   Dawson,	   2005;	  Sathyamala	  et	  al.,	  2005;	   John,	  2007;	   Jeffery	  &	   Jeffery,	  2010).	   Sathyamala	  et	  al.	   (2005)	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  safety	  of	  these	  high	  doses	  has	  not	  been	  clinically	  tested.	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The	   focus	   on	  polio	   vaccination	   has	   not	   only	   affected	   efforts	   to	   combat	   other	   diseases	  and	  to	  provide	  basic	  health	  services,	  the	  critics	  say,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  detrimental	  to	  the	  polio	   eradication	   endeavour	   itself.	   Yadav	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   and	   Jeffery	   and	   Jeffery	   (2011)	  believe	  that	   limited	  resources	  could	  have	  been	  much	  better	  spent	  on	  improving	  water	  quality	  and	  sanitation,	  which	  would	  have	  helped	  combat	  transmission	  of	  several	  water-­‐borne	  diseases,	  including	  polio.	  Gupta	  and	  Puliyel	  have	  made	  a	  similar	  point,	  describing	  themselves	   thusly	   in	   a	   2007	   letter	   in	   the	   Indian	   Journal	   of	   Medical	   Research:	   “The	  authors	  are	  active	  paediatricians	  who	  have	  deep	  interest	   in	  eradicating	  polio	  and	  who	  have	  worked	   to	  make	   the	  programme	  a	  success,	  but	   that	  has	  not	  blinded	   them	  to	   the	  folly	  of	   reaching	  out	  with	  more	  and	  more	  doses	  of	  vaccines,	  where	  attention	   to	  water	  and	  sanitation	  can	  yield	  more	  returns.”	  Chakravarthi,	  a	  public	  health	  researcher,	  claims	  that	   the	   WHO	   was	   warned	   by	   virologists	   in	   1997	   that	   eradication	   would	   only	   be	  successful	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  health	  and	  sanitation	  campaign,	  but	  chose	  to	  ignore	  their	  advice.	   She	   is	   critical	   of	   PPI	   as	   a	   “purely	   technical	   approach	   to	   public	   health”	  (Chakravarthi,	  2009).	  	  
Community	  engagement	  One	   of	   the	   reasons	   John	   et	   al.	   (2006)	   appealed	   to	  medical	   colleagues	   to	   refrain	   from	  fuelling	   controversy	   was	   because	   of	   the	   effect	   this	   can	   have	   on	   acceptance	   of	   public	  health	   initiatives	   among	   recipient	   communities.	   The	   GPEI	   recognises	   that	   community	  engagement	  is	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  eradication	  effort	  in	  its	  draft	  strategic	  plan	  for	  2013-­‐2018	  (WHO,	  2013).	  This	  is	  an	  area	  where	  the	  Indian	  programme	  has	  had	  difficulties	  in	  the	  past.	  Health	  problems	  such	  as	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  diphtheria	  have	  had	  a	  negative	  effect	   on	   how	   the	   eradication	   effort	   is	   viewed	   among	   both	   health	   professionals	   and	  communities	  subjected	  to	  more	  and	  more	  ‘mop-­‐up’	  polio	  vaccination	  operations	  (Jeffery	  &	   Jeffery,	   2010).	   In	   their	   research	   in	   the	   Bijnor	   district	   of	   Uttar	   Pradesh,	   Jeffery	   and	  Jeffery	   (2010)	   discovered	   that	   some	   parents	   were	   being	   strongly	   persuaded	   or	   even	  coerced	   into	   taking	  part	   in	   the	  programme.	  This	   lost	  goodwill	   in	   the	  community,	  with	  villagers	   complaining	   that	   the	   already	   inadequate	   government	   health	   services	   were	  being	   undermined	   by	   the	   PPI	   (Jeffery	   &	   Jeffery,	   2010).	   Similarly,	   Hussain,	   an	  anthropologist	  and	  medical	  student	  who	  conducted	  fieldwork	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  in	  2009,	  found	   that	   a	  one-­‐sided	   view	   of	   OPV	   is	   presented	   in	   social	   mobilisation	   campaigns	  encouraging	  parents	  to	  take	  their	  children	  to	  NIDs	  (described	  as	  UNICEF’s	  “propaganda	  machinery”	  by	  Sathyamala	  et	  al.	  (2005)),	  as	  the	  potential	  risk	  of	  VAPP	  is	  not	  elucidated	  (Hussain	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  According	   to	   Paul	   and	   Dawson	   (2005)	   and	   Hussain	   et	   al.	   (2012),	   proponents	   of	   the	  programme	  have	  justified	  this	  one-­‐sided	  presentation	  of	  the	  facts	  on	  the	  grounds	  that,	  if	  informed	   consent	   were	   sought,	   parents	  might	   decide	   not	   to	   vaccinate	   their	   children,	  with	  consequences	  for	  the	  greater	  good	  through	  a	  loss	  of	  confidence	  in	  vaccination	  for	  polio	  or	  other	  diseases.	  For	  Yadav	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  this	  is	  not	  sufficient:	  “The	  fact	  that	  little	  effort	   is	  made	  to	  obtain	  the	  informed	  consent	  of	  the	  parents	  of	  vaccinated	  children,	  as	  they	  are	  not	   currently	   told	  about	   the	  potential	   limitations	  of	  OPV	  or	   the	  possibility	  of	  vaccine-­‐induced	  harm	  raises	  a	  serious	  ethical	  issue…	  The	  minimal	  but	  very	  real	  risk	  of	  VAPP	  that	  every	  child	  immunized	  by	  OPV	  is	  exposed	  to	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  ignored	  on	  the	  pretext	  of	  the	  larger	  public	  good.”	  In	  general,	  the	  programme	  is	  seen	  as	  operating	  in	  a	  ‘top-­‐down’	  way	  by	  its	  detractors.	  Dasgupta,	  a	  community	  health	  specialist,	  believes	  this	  is	   ultimately	   to	   its	   disadvantage,	   as	   when	   communities	   are	   not	   involved	   in	   decision-­‐making	   scepticism	   and	   distrust	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   the	   result,	   especially	   among	   already	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marginalised	   groups	   (Dasgupta,	   2009).	   Surveys	   of	   private	   sector	   paediatricians	   and	  public	  sector	  physicians	  conducted	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  and	  Bihar	  in	  2009-­‐10	  and	  2006-­‐9	  respectively	  showed	  that	  they	  believed	  parental	   lack	  of	  awareness,	  poor	  confidence	  in	  the	   vaccines,	   superstition,	   religious	   beliefs	   and	   fear	   of	   side	   effects	   to	   be	   the	   most	  significant	  barriers	  to	  polio	  eradication	  (Thacker	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  But	  Taylor	  (2009),	  who	  worked	  with	   programme	  partners	   in	   several	   countries	   from	  2002	   to	   2007,	   sees	   such	  blaming	   of	   local	   ignorance	   as	   the	   “politically	   safer”	   option,	   which	   perhaps	   fails	   to	  recognise	  that	  broader	  socioeconomic	  problems	  inform	  “people’s	  capacity	  for	  rational,	  considered,	   and	   strategic	   non-­‐compliance”	   in	   polio	   and	   other	   immunisation	  programmes.	  In	  this	  context,	  information	  and	  education	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  turn	  the	  tide.	  	  
Discussion	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ‘emerging	  infectious	  diseases’	  paradigm,	  Farmer	  (2001)	  asks,	  “Why	  are	  some	  epidemics	  visible	   to	   those	  who	   fund	  research	  and	  services,	  while	  others	  are	  invisible?”	  Polio	  is	  certainly	  a	  visible	  disease	  on	  the	  world	  stage—it	  has	  engendered	  the	  biggest	   international	   public	   health	   programme	   to	   date	   (UNICEF,	   2012)—but	   some	  assessments	  of	  the	  worth	  and	  success	  of	  this	  programme	  have	  been	  more	  visible	  than	  others.	  This	  reflects	  Farmer’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  paradigm	  as	  a	  whole.	  He	  writes,	   “Popularizing	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘emerging	   infectious	   diseases’	   has	   helped	   to	  marshal	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency,	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  arouse	  in	  large	  bureaucracies.	  Funds	  have	  been	   channeled,	   conferences	   convened,	   articles	  written,	   and	   a	   dedicated	   journal	  founded”	   (Farmer,	   2001).	   In	   the	   polio	   case,	   the	   eradication	   effort	   has	  most	   certainly	  generated	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	   (despite	  numerous	  deadlines	  being	  missed),	   large	   funds	  (that	  some	  feel	  would	  be	  better	  employed	  elsewhere)	  and	  articles	  in	  several	  prominent	  journals	   (such	   as	   The	   Lancet).	   Yet,	   as	   Farmer	   cites	   as	   a	   possible	   danger	   when	   a	  worldview	   becomes	   popularised,	   this	   may	   have	   excluded	   alternative	   viewpoints,	  particularly	  those	  from	  the	  ground	  level.	  Indeed,	  the	  April	  2004	  memorandum	  to	  WHO	  India	  and	  partners	  went	  unacknowledged.5	  	  Exploring	   this	   aspect	   of	   polio	   eradication	   in	   India	   may	   help	   to	   realise	   the	   research	  agenda	  set	  by	  Lee	  and	  Smith	  (2011),	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  different	  actors	  involved	  (or	  not)	  in	  global	   health	   diplomacy	   (GHD)	   and	   their	   relative	   power	   and	   influence.	   Katz	   et	   al.’s	  (2011)	   three	   categories	   of	   GHD—core,	   multistakeholder	   and	   informal—are	   helpful	  here.	   Core	   diplomacy	   is	   concerned	   with	   formal	   negotiations	   between	   states;	  multistakeholder	   diplomacy	   includes	   other	   actors	   and	   does	   not	   necessarily	   end	   in	  binding	   agreements;	   and	   informal	   diplomacy	   constitutes	   “interactions	   between	  international	   public	   health	   actors	   and	   their	   counterparts	   in	   the	   field,	   including	   host	  country	   officials,	   nongovernmental	   organizations,	   private-­‐sector	   companies,	   and	   the	  public”	  (Katz	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  While	  not	  all	   those	   in	   India	  who	  write	  about	  polio	  hold	  the	  same	   views	   as	   those	  who	   signed	   the	  memorandum,	   the	   consensus	   does	   appear	   to	   be	  that,	  when	  polio	  was	  still	  endemic	  in	  their	  country,	  Indian	  voices	  (community	  or	  expert)	  were	  not	  given	  sufficient	  consideration	  by	  those	  who	  decide	  policy	  at	   the	  global	   level.	  Nor	   have	   concerns	   about	   the	   GPEI	   been	   unique	   to	   India.	   In	   her	   ethnography	   of	  Pakistan’s	   eradication	   programme,	   Closser	   (2010)	   records	   examples	   of	   tensions	  between	  national	   and	   international	   level	   administrations.	  An	   Independent	  Monitoring	  Board,	  set	  up	  in	  2010,	  published	  a	  frank	  report	  on	  the	  GPEI	  in	  October	  2011,	  suggesting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Informal	  meetings	  with	  three	  of	  the	  signatories,	  Delhi	  and	  Pune,	  August	  2008.	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that	   its	   overly	   optimistic	   “nearly	   there”	   culture	   rendered	   it	   blind	   to	   its	   operational	  inefficiencies	  and	  dismissive	  of	  external	  criticism	  (IMB,	  2011;	  Roberts,	  2012).	  Katz	  et	  al.	  (2011)	   consider	   the	   GPEI	   to	   fall	  within	   the	  multistakeholder	   category,	   but—although	  we	  can	  only	  speculate—had	  the	  programme	  embraced	  informal	  diplomacy	  and	  heeded	  warnings	  ‘from	  below’	  about	  monovalent	  OPVs,	  sanitation	  and	  community	  perceptions,	  India	  might	  have	  eliminated	  polio	  earlier.	  	  The	   cessation	  of	   transmission	   in	   India	   is	   seen	   as	   a	  major	  milestone	   and	  has	   renewed	  hope	   that	   polio	   can	   be	   eradicated,	   not	   merely	   controlled	   (John	   &	   Vashishtha,	   2012;	  Mohammadi,	   2012).	   In	  April	   2013,	   458	   experts	   from	  80	   countries,	   including	   29	   from	  India,	   signed	   a	   Scientific	   Declaration	   on	   Polio	   Eradication	   stating	   that	   eradication	   is	  indeed	   achievable	   (Bhutta	   &	   Orenstein,	   2013;	   Emory	   Vaccine	   Center,	   2013).	   Yet	   the	  tensions	  and	  controversies	  surrounding	  the	  Indian	  programme	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  or	  so	  highlight	   the	  difficulties	   in	   balancing	  different	   imperatives:	   to	   engender	   and	  maintain	  support	   for	   global	   efforts	   to	   control	   infectious	   disease	  while	   also	   allowing	   debate	   on	  scientific	   uncertainties	   and	   societal	   costs	   and	   benefits.	   This	   has	   implications	   for	   the	  emerging	  field	  of	  global	  health	  diplomacy.	  Katz	  et	  al	  (2011)	  write,	  “Expanding	  demands	  on	  global	  health	  diplomacy	  require	  a	  delicate	  combination	  of	   technical	  expertise,	   legal	  knowledge,	   and	   diplomatic	   skills	   that	   have	   not	   been	   systematically	   cultivated	   among	  either	  foreign	  service	  or	  global	  health	  professionals.	  Nonetheless,	  high	  expectations	  that	  global	   health	   initiatives	   will	   achieve	   development	   and	   diplomatic	   goals	   beyond	   the	  immediate	   technical	   objectives	   may	   be	   thwarted	   by	   this	   gap.”	   The	   Indian	   polio	   case	  shows	  that	  this	  gap	  may	  mean	  that	  the	  technical	  objectives	  are	  not	  achieved	  either,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  as	  quickly	  as	  they	  could	  be.	  	  
Conclusion	  The	   Global	   Polio	   Eradication	   Initiative	   is	   a	   massive	   and	   long-­‐standing	   international	  health	   programme	   that	   has	   received	   support	   from	   an	   array	   of	   well-­‐respected	  organisations,	  but	  has	  also	  encountered	  criticism	  at	  the	  country	  level.	  The	  Indian	  	  case	  shows	   that	  global	  health	  diplomacy	  as	  a	  practice	   is	  hard.	   If	  health	  programmes	  are	   to	  run	  at	  maximum	  efficiency,	   informal	  diplomacy	  must	  be	  employed.	  Messages	  from	  the	  ground,	   such	   as	   the	   need	   for	   adequate	   sanitation	   alongside	   vaccination,	   need	   to	   be	  heard.	   Where	   this	   is	   perceived	   not	   to	   happen,	   controversies	   may	   escalate,	   breeding	  distrust	  and	  potentially	  undermining	  eradication	  efforts.	  This	  is	  now	  acknowledged	  by	  the	   GPEI.	   The	   Independent	  Monitoring	   Board’s	   2011	   report	   led	   to	   a	   shake-­‐up	   of	   the	  programme’s	  management	  structure	  and	  culture,	  to	  make	  it	   less	  hierarchical	  (Roberts,	  2012).	  More	   broadly,	   the	   challenge	   remains	   for	   global	   health	   diplomacy	   as	   a	   nascent	  field	  of	  scholarship	  to	  explore	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  diplomacy	  of	  global	  health	  initiatives	  can	   be	   more	   inclusive	   of	   national	   level	   voices,	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   leads	   to	   efficacious	  governance	  and	  implementation.	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